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The existence of black market exchange rates of developing countries
is common knowledge. and the Indian rupee has been traded in an unofficial
"free" market for along time (Pi ck 1975. p. 239).

The emergence of the

commodities black market in general and the currency black market in parti cul ar is the outcome of offi ci a 1 contro 1 on the free market operati on.
In the case of the exchange rate, an additional factor is important--a
government's perception of the currency's prestige.

For example, the

political stability of many governments in the developing countries is
often at stake when the government decides to devalue currency, even when
such a decision is economically sound.

the possible political opposition

explains partly why most developing countries opt for a fixed exchange rate
regime and sticks to the overvalued exchange rate. 1
favor of a fixed exchange rate is the following:

One strong opinion in

the developing countries

cannot fol low an independent course in today's world regarding the exchange
rate of their currencies.

Either they peg their currencies to major world

currencies, in which case it is a free floating exchange rate as the base
currency floats, or they fix the exchange rate of their currencies vis-avi s a basket of currenci es, in whi ch case it consti tutes a managed float.
What the developing countries fear most is the speculation with the
exchange rate of their currencies.
val uabl e foreign exchange.
chooses

a fixed

In this case, the country loses

To safeguard national interest, the country

exchange

rate

regime.

Along wi th

the

fi xed

exchange rate, an elaborate control mechanism operates in the case of both

lOut of 146 members of the International Monetary Fund, 51 members
followed a fixed exchange rate system, 17 members followed a basket of
currency approach, and on 1y 38 members fo 11 owed a more fl exi b 1 e exchange
rate in 1984 (I.I~.F. 1984, p. 9).
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exports and imports.

The potenti all oss of we 1 fare in the form of di s-

tortion in resource allocation is now well established in the literature
(Bhagawati 1978; Bhagawati and Hansen 1973).

One common outcome of these

control mechanism is the emergence of black market.
A black market is the euphemism for an illegal market where the price
of the commodity varies with the officially fixed minimum or maximum price.
Such a market became very common after the World War II when even the
mature western economies were subject to widespread control.

The theory of

the black market is analyzed in Boulding (1947), Bronfenbrenner (1947), and
Michaely (1954).

This tool of analysis 'has been applied to explain the

specific behavior of the black market for foreign exchange in Culbertson
(1975) and Sheikh (1976).

Both model s are based on partial equil ibrium

analysis and make restrictive assumptions regarding the sources of supply
to the black market for foreign exchange. Although Sheikh emphasizes smuggling and underinvoicing of exports as the main sources, Culbertson
stresses the resa 1 e of the offi ci all y allocated forei gn exchange.

The

black market exchange rate behavior is analyzed in a macroeconomic framework by Nowark (1984) and Dicki and Noursi (1975).

The 1 atter expl ains the

operati on of offi ci all y sponsored para 1 1 e 1 forei gn exchange market for
Syria.

The analysis has been extended and applied for different countries,

e.g., Gupta (1981) for India, Dornbusch et ale (1983) for Brazil, and Olgun
(1984) for Turkey.

The black market is integrated with smuggling in Nowak

(1984) and Pi tt (1984).

Since the early seventies, the monetary approach dominated expl anation of exchange rate behavior.

In the monetarist framework, the exchange

rate is defined as the relative price of monies.

As such, the domestic

money stock should influence the black market exchange rate.

The relation-
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ship between the domestic stock of money and the black market exchange rate
has been seen as a two-way relationship in the case of exchange control
economies.

Whi 1 e the expectations about the future exchange rate

adjustment in the black market can influence the domestic demand for money,
the change in the money supply in the domestic economy is expected to have
effects on the exchange rate in the black market.

Both these aspects have

been studied theoretically and empirically by Blejer (1978 a,

b).

Regarding the first interrel ationship, Bl ejer (1978 b) has shown that for
some exchange control regimes the demand for money is significantly reduced
I

when the expectations of a black market depreciation of exchange rates
intensify.

In the latter case, the expected return from holding foreign

currency assets increases and individuals tend to substitute domestic
assets with foreign ones as the opportunity cost of holding domestic money
increases.
balances.

This leads to a reduction in the demand for domestic cash
One implication of this interlink is the following:

any inter-

vention in the black market exchange rate by the government will have
repercussions in the domestic demand for money, and this wi 11 compl icate
the effects of any stabilization policies.
The second aspect of the interrelationship between the change in the
domestic money supply and the change in the free market exchange rate is in
1 i ne with the broad monetari st tradi ti on in whi ch monetary vari ab 1 es are

supposed to influence exchange rate behavior (Frenkel 1976; Dornbusch 1976;
Mussa 1976).

In an exchange control regime where the official · exchange

rate is fixed, any disequilibrium in the domestic money market in the form
of an excess supply of money is expected to have a spil lover effect on both
balance of payment and exchange rate variation (Friedman 1953; Musha 1976).
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When the official rate is fixed, the latter is reflected through the change
in the exchange rate in the black market.

Thi s aspect has been ana 1 yzed

within a standard monetarist framework in Blejer (1978 a), where the basic
hypothesis tested empirically was that the exchange rate in the black
market is freely determined by market forces and responds to disequilibrium
in the domestic money market.
In the monetarist tradition Blejer has used the demand for money
function in which the interest rate has not been incorporated as an
argument.

But the di versi on of forei gn exchange from the offi ci a 1 market

to the black market depends on two types of margin of choice.

The first is

between money and goods, and the second is between money and bonds.
Although the first is relevant for the goods market, the second is relevant
for the capital market.

Blejer has emphasized the first margin of choice,

because he argues that inflation is predominant for the countries in which
he tested his model.
A1 though B1 ejer may be correct within the context of his study, the
consideration of capital market is important for two reasons.

First, in

the absence of information about illegal trade across national boundaries,
the latter is not incorporated in the model.

Second, on the assumption of

free movement of capital in the international market, the public diverts a
porti on of offi ci all y allocated forei gn exchange to earn a profi t.

The

latter depends on the difference between the domestic nominal interest rate
and that of the foreign country.
Based on the above argument, it is imperative that we should retain
the interest rate i the demand for money function.

Accordingly, the mone-

tarist model used by Blejer is modified in the present study.
will be applied to the Indian economy.

The model

India presents a unique example of
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a system of elaborate exchange controls under a fixed exchange rate system.
Over time, the disequilibrium in the domestic money market in the form of
excess supply of money has created inflation.

Moreover, the black market

exchange rate has deviated consistently from the official exchange rate
(Figure 1).

This relationship has not been explored in India's case.

The

present paper is an attempt to bridge this gap.
This paper is divided into several sections.

Section II presents the

theoretical framework where the basic model is explained.
deliberates the data and the empirical results.

Section III

In the final section, the

conclusion and the policy implication of this study is presented.
II.

The Theoretical Framework

We make the following assumptions to keep the model simple.

The black

market is assumed as an outlet for capital transactions that are barred
from the official market.

The small country assumption is retained so that

the prices of traded goods are exogenously given.
non traded goods sector.

There also exists a

There is full employment in the economy and

monetary disequilibrium does not affect the rate of growth of real income.
In the money market, the money supply is determined by the
relationship
r~ s =

k (R + D),

( 1)

where
k = money multiplier
R

= foreign

exchange reserve

D = domestic credit component of the monetary base.
The demand for money is
Md = P . md

( 2)
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EXCHAf\JGE RATE VARIATION:1954 -1980
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Exchange Rate Variation ~ 1954~80 (quarterly)
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and
(3 )

where P equals the price level, r equals the rate of interest, y equals the
real permanent income,

P~

equals the expected rate of domestic inflation,

and the asteri sk "*" i ndi cates the ti me rate of change of the vari ab 1e.
For stock equilibrium in the money market, the nominal quantity of
money must be equal, ex post, to the demand for nominal cash balances.

To

satisfy this, the market must clear in each period and this requires the
flow equilibrium, or
r~*s --

M*d,

(4)

or by substitution from equations (1) and (2), we obtain
k* + (1 - r) R* + rD* = p* + md,

(5)

where
D

r = --R+ D

It has been establ ished that the nominal money supply is endogenous in a
small open economy under a fixed exchange rate.
determi ne the

~

The central bank can only

ante quanti ty of money by changi ng the domesti c credi t

component of the monetary base.
ba 1 ances create an

~

This action and the flow demand for real

ante excess flow suppl y of money.

It is to that ex

ante flow disequilibrium that the publ ic reacts, and this reaction is
reflected in changes in the foreign exchange reserve (R) through the
balance of payment.
balance.

This is long-run adjustment to restore monetary

In the short run, there is inflation.

determines the ex post nominal quantity of money.

Therefore, the public
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The above discussion suggests that the operative measure of money
market disequilibrium should be an

~

ante measure excluding the

endogenous reaction of the foreign exchange reserve.

So the flow monetary

disequilibrium in the model is measured as the difference between the
expansion of the domestic credit component and the changes in the demand
for a real cash balance.
The aggregate price level is the geometric mean of the prices of
traded and nontraded goods: 2
(6 )

where B equals the share of traded goods in the total expenditure.
The rate of domestic inflation can be written as
p*

=

B pf + (1 - B) PN·

(6a)

The pri ce of traded goods is exogenous 1 y gi ven and its rate of change is
determined by the world rate of inflation

(P~)

and by changes in the

offi ci a 1 exchange rate (Eo), or by

r=

P

P~ + E~.

(7)

An excess supply of money implies an excess demand for goods.

We further

assume that the excess demand for non traded goods varies monotonically with
excess demand throughout the economy.

We now postulate the fol lowing

equation for the rate of change of the prices of nontraded goods:

P*N = P*T + A( rD* + k* - Md*) '

(8)

where A is the elasticity of the relative prices to monetary imbalance. 3

2The distinction between traded and nontraded goods follows
traditional literature. See Riley (1982).
3Any change in the price of traded goods will affect the price of
nontraded goods through elasticity of substitution in factors of production
in case of production and marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
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Substituting from equations (7) and (8) and then from the equation
(6a), gives
p* = h (P: + E~) + (I - h) (rO* + k* - md),

wh e re h

=

( 9)

-+~X--+-t---I---e~) .

"T"1

The supply of foreign exchange in the black market varies positively
with the profit possibi 1 ity.

The 1 atter, again, varies directl y with the

differential of the official rate and the black market rate.

Therefore, we

postulate the following supply function of foreign exchange to the black
market
1n FS

= d1

Eb

(10)

+ d2 In{_)

Eo
where Eb is the black market exchange rate.
The demand for foreign currency depends positively on the return
derived from holding the asset and is negatively related to the return
derived from holding the alternative asset.

The return from holding

foreign currency as an asset is a function of the expected rate of
deprec i ati on in the black market.

Further, si nce expectati ons are formed

in the future, people are likely to anticipate that any expected domestic
inflation over world inflation will also be transmitted to the exchange
rate.

From thi s consi derati on, we postu 1 ate the fo 11 owi ng expressi on for

the expected depreciation of the black market exchange rate:
Eb = (In P - ln Pw - ln Eb) + P; - P~.

( 11 )

The net return for holding a foreign asset is the foreign nominal interest
rate mi nus the opportuni ty cost in the form of domesti c nomi na 1 interest
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rate.

We assume that the nominal interest differential is denominated by

the variation in the expected rate of inflation.

The demand function for

foreign exchange in the black market is specified as follows: 4
(12)
From equations (11) and (12), we obtain
ln Fg = Cl + C2 (In P - ln Pw - ln Eb + P~) - q P~.

(12a)

If we assume that own return elasticity is equal to alternative cost
elasticity (q), then (12a) reduces to
(13)
From equations (10) and (13) after differentiation, we obtain
(14)
(15)

The flow equilibrium condition in the black market require that
F~* = F~*,

and from equations (14) and (15), we have
d2 (E b - E~) = C2 (p* - P~ - Eb),
or
(16)

4This specification assumes that no legal risk is involved in dealing
in the black market since the operation of this market is tolerated by the
government.
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Substitution of p* from equation (9) gives
d2 + C2 h *
C2(1 - h)
E*b = (- - - - - ) E0 + - - - - - (rD* + k* - md* - P*)
w •
d2 + C2

(17)

Equation (17) formulates the depreciation rate of the black market exchange
rate as a weighted average of the devaluation rate of the official exchange
rate and the flow monetary disequilibrium.
The official exchange rate is regarded by the government as a policy
instrument and the change in the official rate follows some pol icy
decision.

The latter can be assumed to depend on some form of reaction

function that is aimed at maximizing government uti 1 ity function. 5 One
specification of this reaction function may be
(18)

o<

b < 1.

When b = 1, there wi 11 be a free fl oati ng exchange rate conformi ng to the
purchasing power parity doctrine.

When b

= 0, there will be a fixed

exchange rate independent of monetary disequilibrium in the domestic
market.
If the official exchange rate is endogenously determined by the
reaction function (18), we can write equation (17) as fol lows:
From equation (18) and using equation (9), we obtain
E*o

= b(1 - h)
1 -

t>n

[rD* + k* - m*d - P~J.

(19)

5If the government reacts systematically to a particular macroeconomic
variable, then there are behavioral functions describing how monetary
policy responds to these policy goal variable. See Henderson and Turnovsky
(1972), and Ujii (1978).
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Next, by substituting from equations (19) and (17), we obtain
(C 2 + bd2)(1 - h)

E*b = - - - - - - - - -[ rD * + d* - md* - P*]
w'

(1 - bh)(d 2 + C2)

or

E*b

(20)

=

where

A=

(C 2 + bd2)(1 - h)
(1 - bh)(d 2 + C2)

In this form, the rate of depreciation of the bl ack market exchange rate
depends on the domestic monetary disequilibrium and the world rate of
inflation.
Equi 1 ibri um in thi s system wi 11 be achieved when the monetary
authority expands the money supply in such a rate that the ex ante excess
flow supply of money is equal to the world rate of inflation.

This occurs

when the rate of expansion of the domestic credit component exceeds the
growth in the demand for real balances by the world rate of inflation.
Then the domestic rate of inflation will be at par with the world rate of
i nfl ati on and both the offi ci a 1 and the black market exchange rate wi 11
remain constant.
III.

Data and Empirical Result

The peri od of the present study is from 1954 to 1980.

The quarterl y

data used in this study are from International Financial Statistics, pub1 i shed by International Monetary Fund, except the data on national income.
The quarterly data of India's national income are not available.

The

quarterly data have been estimated fo1 lowing the interpolation procedure as
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in Boot et ale (1967).

The estimation of the model (equation 20) has been

done with the fol lowing steps:
The variable m~ is first estimated from equation (3) by using the
fa 1 1 owi ng 1 i near form:

Two variables, permanent income (y) and expected rate of infl ation (P:),
are

not observed.

They have been estimated by uti 1 izing adaptive

expectation. 6
The empirical estimation of the model

(Equation 20) has been made on

the basi s of quarter 1 y data and usi ng both defi ni ti on s of money (H 1 and
M2 ).7

The results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.

The explanatory

vari ab 1 e has been 1 agged once and a further increase in the 1 ag does not
lead to any improvement of the results.

Therefore, only one lag is used.

The results in both cases (two definitions of money) support the monetarist

6To estimate the expected rate of infl ation,
expectation hypothesis is used:

a traditional adaptive

* = 8P *t + (1 - B) P*t - 1 , where the rate of inflation (P *t ) is measured
Pet
by the percentage change in the consumer price index and S is a constant.
Permanent income is defined as

Yt = hYr + (1 - h) Yt - 1 ,
where Y ~ is current income and Yt is permanent income, both at constant
prices, and h is a constant.
To obtain the optimum values of Band h
kayak transformation is used and regression technique applied.
The
estimated values of Band h gives highest value of R2. These values of
and h are used to estimat~ · both the permanent income and the expected rate
of inflation.
7The broad definition of money M2 consists of M1 and quasi money. The
1 atter incl udes time deposits in the commercial banks. The data are taken
from International Financial Statistics.

Table 1.

The black market exchange rate equation, 1954-1980:

M1 definition of money

* + A2 (rO* + d* - md* - P* )t-l
Eb* = A0 + Al (rO* + k* - md - Pw)t
w

Intercept

Al

Standard error
t-statistics

1.053
(0.415)
(2.538)

0.413
(0.092)
(4.505)

Standard error
t-statistics

0.817
(0.448)
(1.821)*

0.402
(0.092)
(4.381)

1.

2.

A2

0.145
(0.097)
(1.498)**

R2

RZ

F

O-H
Statistic

0.311

0.298

23.69

1.59

0.32

0.31

16.68

1.55

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Not significant at the 10 percent level.
Note:

Other t-statistics are significant at the 5 percent level.

.......
~

Table 2.

The black market exchange rate equation, 1954-1980:

M2 definition of money

* + A2 (rD* + k* - md* - P* )t-1
Eb* = AO + Al (rD * + k* - md - Pw)t
w

Intercept

Al

Standard error
t-statistics

0.692
(0.424)
(1.634)*

0.535
(0.098)
(5.486)

Standard error
t-statistics

0.498
(0.472)
(1.057)*

0.538
(0.098)
(5.469)

1.

2.

A2

0.103
(0.099)
(1.04)*

R2

R2

F

D-W
Statistic

0.36

0.35

29.87

1.53

0.37

0.35

20.09

1.56

*Not significant at the 10 percent level.
Note:

Other t-statistics are significant.

I--'

CJ1
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position. as the signs of the coefficients are positive.

The positive sign

of the coefficients prove the theoretical position that a positive rate of
growth of excess money supply \'lill lead to a depreciation in the black
market exchange rate.

Further, the coefficients are significantly dif-

ferent from zero and in case of one lag, the sum of the coefficients is
0.55 in case of Ml definition and about 0.64 in the case of the M2 definition.

Increasing the lag of the explanatory variable has led to the

negative sign of the coefficients and therefore not reported here.
IV.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this paper is to test the monetarist proposition
that a disequilibrium in the domestic money market will have a spillover
effect on the exchange rate of the country.

Since India is a fixed

exchange rate regime. the black market exchange rate can be taken as a
proxy of free exchange rate.

From the result, it is obvious that the

monetarist proposition holds for the case of India to a significant extent.
When the official exchange rate becomes flexible, as has been the case in
India since 1971, this flexibility absorbs some shock of the domestic
monetary di sequi 1 i bri um.

The black market exchange rate is supposed to

fl uctuate 1 ess and the gap between the two exchange rates shoul d be narrowed down.

This has happened in India, which is evident from Figure 1.

The policy prescription that emerges from this paper is that the government
should be cautious enough regarding the growth of domestic credit component
of the monetary base.

Any lack of control on the growth of domestic credit

component will result in the loss of precious foreign exchange as the
increasing gap between the black market exchange rate and the official rate
will induce remittances of foreign currency through the unofficial channel.
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